Roth distorts the Demjanjuk trial to focus maximum attention on the eyewitness testimony of a Treblinka survivor who had previously claimed that Ivan the Terrible was killed but who now identifies him as Demjanjuk. In spotlighting this logical impossibility, Roth suggests an aesthetic and an ethos for representing the Holocaust.
In January 1989 [sic] I was caught up in a Middle East crisis all my own, a personal upheaval that had the unmistakable signposts of the impossible, as opposed to those of the predictable, plausible reality to which I am as hopelessly addicted as any other human being [. . .] a satirizing of me so bizarre and unrealistic as to exceed by far the boundaries of amusing mischief I may myself have playfully perpetrated on my own existence. ("Jewish Mischief " 1) Fact or fiction? All Roth's essay really establishes is that the former is stranger, or less "plausible," than the latter. In the confusion, the reader's impulse is to turn to biographies and other contemporary records in an attempt to discover what really happened, unable to entertain the proposal that something may be simultaneously true and untrue.
The novel further perpetuates this troubling fiction-reality opposition through a series of problematic, unstable identities. "Multiple selves had been on my mind for months now," confides Philip (152) after his Halcion-induced breakdown, which is described as a "transformation" and a "deformation" (27; emphasis in original). Purely fictional characters and personages with real-life referents populate the novel, including Appelfeld, Demjanjuk, and Klinghoffer. There are numerous manifestations of "the universal urge to be otherwise" (180) and the "altogether human desire to be convinced by lies" (364). These instances include Philip's masquerades as Pierre Roget and Philippe Sollers; an adopted Parisian lawyer who has invented her own history; tourists to the Holy Land who believe they are the Messiah; Jinx Possesski's resemblance to Philip's (and Roth's) first wife; George Ziad's incarnation in Chicago; the Islamic concept of taqiya or dissimulation (145); an Israeli soldier with a conscience; Pipik's missing persons agency; the strange comparison of Philip to Sammy Davis Jr.; the disputed fake Klinghoffer diaries; and a Lee Harvey Oswald double. At their most extreme, this thesaurus of doublings results in situations such as Philip pretending to be someone else while talking on the phone to Pipik who is pretending to be him, and, beyond that, Philip pretending to be Pipik, who, in turn, is pretending to be Philip, so that Philip is both pretending to be and not to be himself, or as Roth puts it, "usurping the identity of the usurper who had usurped mine" (156) . "I assure you," says the beleaguered Philip at one point, "that I am no more myself than anyone else around here" (148). In this novel, " [e] rror, misprision, fakery, fantasy, ignorance, falsification, and mischief " reign (209) .
At the heart of this confusion are two pairings, two sets of twins (implying it is The Comedy of Errors, as much as The Merchant of Venice, that is the novel's tutelary spirit): Philip/Pipik and John Demjanjuk/Ivan the Terrible. That the second is at least as important as the first is emphasized by the fact that the trial and the lookalike are the first things mentioned (17), and Pipik underscores the point: "Demjanjuk in that courtroom has everything to do with us" (82; emphasis in original). In a series of parallels, Demjanjuk claims to be Demjanjuk as Philip and Pipik claim to be Philip Roth, and Demjanjuk claims not to be Ivan as Pipik and (sometimes) Philip claims not to be Pipik. It is difficult to believe that the "big, cheerful palooka" Demjanjuk is Ivan because Ivan would surely look more terrible (61); on the other hand, it may be when he looks least like Ivan that he is most like Ivan because it is unlikely that Ivan would look Ivanish. The same circular logic underpins Philip's reflection that " [m] aybe that was how [Pipik] thought somebody who had published sixteen books would talk on the phone to an interviewer, while the fact is that if I talked like that I might not have had to write sixteen books" (41). In other words, Pipik sounds more like Philip than Philip does, except that if Philip were more Philip-like, he would not be Philip. But the Demjanjuk-Ivan pairing is more than the "metonomy for the question of identity posed in the novel by Philip's 'double'" proposed by Debra Shostak (Philip Roth 184). Rather, it constitutes the logical predicament that Operation Shylock suggests to be its governing aesthetic philosophy. The testimony of Treblinka survivor Eliahu Rosenberg-namely, that Ivan the Terrible is both dead and alive-is the crucial conundrum of this predicament. Rosenberg's testimony, which recapitulates the Philip-Pipik paradox that " [a] man cannot be in two places at one time" (Operation Shylock 269), is so stunning in its implications that Roth contorts the Demjanjuk trial to give it precedence. Much has been written on the relationship between Philip and Pipik, and so the intention here is not to explore further the idea of multiple or projected selves.
5 Rather, it is to concentrate on the Demjanjuk-Ivan twinning and the consequences of the "dead and alive" testimony for approaching the Holocaust, historiography, and eyewitness evidence.
Three trials are referred to in Operation Shylock: the Demjanjuk trial, the trial of the younger brother of Zee's friend Kamil in "the occupier's travesty of a courtroom", and the trial of Shylock in The Merchant of Venice ("this modern trial of the Jew, this trial which never ends" [128, 274] ). The tenor of the novel, moreover, is juridical. The subtitle "A Confession" suggests a penal discourse, and the opening words of the preface are "[f ]or legal reasons" (13). The judicial process is foregrounded for what seem to be three reasons: to establish competing truth systems, to spotlight the process of determining identity, and to make the book's central point about plausibility that truth is stranger than fiction.
The State of Israel v. John Demjanjuk was only the latest stage in an ongoing series of judicial events; because these events relate to the crucial issue of identity, they are important to set out in some detail. Michael Hanusiak, editor of the Ukrainian Daily News, first identified as someone who had trained at the Trawniki camp in Poland, acted as watchman with an SS unit at the Sobibor death camp and as a guard at the Flossenburg concentration camp, and participated in the mass extermination of Jews in Sobibor (Teicholz 31) . 6 The U.S. Office of Special Investigations (OSI), a unit within the Justice Department was investigating him (Teicholz 31) . In 1976, however, a Treblinka survivor, Eugen Turovsky, identified a photograph of Demjanjuk as that of Ivan the Terrible, a particularly sadistic guard at Treblinka who had committed atrocities as people entered the gas chambers. Other Treblinka survivors-Avraham Goldfarb, Yossef Czarny, Gustav Boraks and Avraham Lindvasser-made the same idendification, basing it on distinctive facial physiognomy (Teicholz 33, 34, 39, 41 42) . "It is the same facial build, the same nose, the same eyes, the same forehead," said Yossef Czarny (39); "I recognize him from his facial features," declared Gustav Boraks (41). "That is his nose, his eyes, and his mouth," insisted Avraham Lindwasser (42). But another survivor, Shlomo Hellman, failed to make the same identification, and when the photograph was shown to Eliahu Rosenberg, he was "not willing to identify him with certainty" (35, 40). But he was "struck by the likeness" and "believed that should he see Ivan, alive, before him now-he would recognize him" (35 Here, Teicholz conflates what were really two distinct questions-a conflation also performed by the trial and (for other reasons) Operation Shylock. In a Rothean way, the questions "Who is he?" and "What did he do?" become merged in the query: Is Demjanjuk Ivan the Terrible?
There is, legally speaking, no crime of "being Ivan the Terrible." The charges against Demjanjuk were made under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 1950, which was passed by the Knesset on 1 August 1950 and incorporated the complete text of the charter of the Nuremberg Trials, as emended and ratified by the United Nations General Assembly (Teicholz 120) . Demjanjuk was charged with "crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes against the Jewish people, and with murder under the penal code of the State of Israel" (104): the first three elements of this are the offences created by section 1(a) (1)- (3) Nonetheless, the Jerusalem hearing effectively proceeded as the trial of Ivan the Terrible. Yonah Blatman, the Israeli state attorney, opened the prosecution's case with the words, "Before us stands an accused by the name of John Demjanjuk. He is the Demjanjuk who has been known as 'Ivan the Terrible'" (qtd. in Teicholz 116). Yoram Sheftel, the lead defense lawyer (after O'Connor's dismissal), characterized the whole proceedings as a "conspiracy to convict John Demjanjuk as 'Ivan the Terrible,'" using this phrase as the subtitle of his book about the trial. In delivering the verdict, the principal judge, Dov Levin, commented that "the description of these facts [about Treblinka] in their entirety, on the historical plain [sic] , as well as with regard to the identity of the accused, is, in fact, part of the same entity [. . .] One matter depends on the other" (qtd. in Teicholz 337) . If the crimes have been committed, runs this logic, Demjanjuk is Ivan. "I believe the atrocities took place," Levin declared, adding as the necessary corollary, "and Ivan existed" (350). The New York Times reported that Demjanjuk told the court before sentencing, "I am not Ivan the Terrible, and to that God is the most just witness" (qtd. in Kifner 11) . Teicholz records a more intriguingly ambivalent statement: "It was not the prisoners who gave me the name Ivan Grozny, that human was not I, Ivan Demjanjuk" (352)-words that simultaneously suggest that Grozny was a name given to him by someone (if not the prisoners), yet that he was not Grozny. The flavor is very much that of Shakespeare's trial, which seems to accuse Shylock simply of being Shylock: Portia's first question, "Is your name Shylock?", is answered by "Shylock is my name" (4.1.171) .
Operation Shylock exploits the ambiguities created by Demjanjuk's possible participation in war crimes and, more specifically, his "real" mask as Ivan the Terrible, defining the latter as "the identity issue at the heart of the case" (52). In the Jerusalem courtroom, eyewitness survivor Epstein accomplished a coup de théâtre by pointing at the accused and crying, "Yes, he's sitting there. There he is!" (qtd. in Teicholz 139; emphasis in original). Indubitably "he" was sitting there, but what was meant by "he"? Roth's novel perpetuates the dilemma. "There he was," thinks Philip four times, twice adding, "or wasn't" (60, 62, 65) . Pipik echoes these thoughts: "Is he or isn't he, was he or wasn't he?" (77). The confusion serves to problematize the very concept of identity: Is it a matter of name, of deed, or of irreducible substance? Is whether Demjanjuk committed war crimes less important than whether he is (or was) Ivan the Terrible? The question, "Who are you?"-most often asked by Philip in relation to Pipik or Jinx-recurs in variant forms like a leitmotif throughout the novel (107, 190, 191, 226, 339) . Less frequent is the question, what are you? (107, 190, 191) . Seeming to give precedence to name over substance, Philip is open to Jinx's accusation, "Do you ever, ever, ever think of anything other than your fucking name!" (99; emphasis in original). But the novel also points in the opposite direction, for example, when Philip finds Pipik in his hotel bedroom: "'You,' he said. That was all. But for him that was the accusation: I who was I" (179). When Demjanjuk protests, "I am not that awful man to whom you refer. I am innocent," he crucially, if unwittingly, answers both questions (50).
In making the Demjanjuk-Ivan identification issue central to the process, the eyewitness testimony of Treblinka survivors was crucial to the Jerusalem trial. This situation produced other incompatibilities: the impossibility of remembering and the impossibility of forgetting, as well as the inconceivability that such acts were committed and the fact that they were. Giving the verdict, Levin posed a series of questions: It is worth noting the apparent contradiction implied here in the difficulty of remembering "unforgettable days." Levin did not underestimate the inherent difficulties in Holocaust testimony, noting that in gaining "an impression of [the eyewitnesses'] reliability [. . . w]e must also pay heed to the possession of a memory that may have betrayed them," despite the fact that the events in question are "etched in their very flesh" (337).
The implied contract between eyewitness and audience-"you can believe it because I saw it happen"-is one of enormous potency. As a consequence, the eyewitness bears an awesome responsibility not only to but also on behalf of others (Felman and Laub 3) . The term witness is fruitfully polysemic. The Oxford English Dictionary gives various definitions to the word: attestation; "the action or condition of being an observer of an event"; testimony; "evidential mark or sign, a token"; "a manuscript or early version which is regarded as evidence of authority for the text"; "one who testifies for Christ [. . .] esp[ecially] by death, a martyr"; "to be present as an observer at; to see with one's own eyes" ("Witness"). The multiplying implications are of authenticity, presence, truth, proof, and verification. The religious connotations of witnessing underline the fact that the ethos 8 of the speaker/writer-named by Aristotle in The Art of Rhetoric as the first "proof " by which speech may be guaranteed (1.2.3)-assumes tremendous importance. In the Demjanjuk case, this was compounded by the fact that, as the lead prosecutor, Michael Shaked, said, "this may be the one of the last trials where it is possible to bring to the stand witnesses who can say, 'We were there'" (qtd. in Teicholz 122).
The figure of the eyewitness, then, is key. This becomes particularly significant in the case of the previously mentioned Rosenberg, an eyewitness survivor of Treblinka and the focus of much attention in Operation Shylock. On 11 May 1976 , the OSI had shown Rosenberg an album containing seventeen photographs, including one of Demjanjuk. He had seen a "great resemblance" to Ivan the Terrible but "decline [d] " to identify him as such "with certainty" (qtd. in Wagenaar 124). In 1978, Rosenberg failed to select the same photo of Demjanjuk (124). On 25 December 1979, he had been shown, among other photographs, the Trawniki pass that, other witnesses had suggested, belonged to Ivan and Demjanjuk. The photo of this, Rosenberg said, reminded him "very much" of Ivan (qtd in. ). Yet more devastating to the prosecution than this somewhat tentative and inconsistent identification were Rosenberg's appearances on the witness stand on 25 February, 26 February, and 2 March 1987. A trial of former Treblinka SS men in Düsseldorf from October 1964 to August 1965 had "shocked" survivors by revealing that Germans they had believed killed in the Treblinka Uprising on 2 August 1943 were still alive . Yonah Blatman raised this point as he opened the case for the prosecution of Demjanjuk: "The rumor has circulated that Ivan had been killed at the time of the revolt. [. . .] This court is going to show how false that rumor was" (qtd. in Teicholz 117). But in Rosenberg's case, there was particularly damning evidence. In 1947 he had been working in Vienna for the Bricha, the underground movement to Palestine. When people heard that he had survived Treblinka, he was urged to speak to Tadik Friedman, a Polish Jew who worked at the Jewish Agency trying to track down Nazis. In two sessions, Rosenberg spoke to Friedman in Yiddish, which Friedman translated into German for a typist to record. Describing the uprising in the camp, Rosenberg said that "some prisoners stormed the barracks of the Ukrainians, where Ivan slept, and beat them to death with shovels" (151). Blatman placed this account, now a "crumbling, yellow typescript" before the Jerusalem court, and in response, Rosenberg explained that he had learned later that what his friends had told him in the forest was "a story-fiction-a mere boast [. . .] even those who had told the tale hadn't seen it for themselves" (qtd. in Teicholz 151). Rosenberg, of course, was now saying that Ivan was alive.
Next, Rosenberg was asked to identify Ivan in the courtroom. He asked Demjanjuk to remove his glasses. According to Teicholz, Demjanjuk then said, "I want that he come close to me-right here," pointing to the edge of his booth (qtd. in Teicholz 152). As Rosenberg approached, Demjanjuk "suddenly stuck out his hand, and said, 'Shalom' with childish glee" (152; emphasis in original). Rosenberg recoiled; when prompted by Judge Levin, he declared, "This is Ivan. I say so unhesitatingly and without the slightest doubt. Ivan from Treblinka-from the gas chambers. The man I am looking at now. I saw those eyes, those murderous eyes" (153). This is not how the defense lawyer, Yoram Sheftel, remembers these moments. According to Sheftel, it was Rosenberg who said, "May I get a little closer?", and Demjanjuk attorney O'Connor replied, "Mr. Rosenberg, would you please approach?" (46). The accused responded "by holding out his hand and saying 'Shalom'" (Sheftel 46; emphasis in original). (In Operation Shylock, Roth describes the moment as "one in which a friendly, grinning Demjanjuk is warmly offering Rosenberg his hand to shake" [284] ). Removing the glasses was, for Sheftel, "obviously an attempt [. . .] to create an unnecessary dramatic effect typical of show trials," and Rosenberg's mention of "murderous eyes" was nothing more than the typical Yiddish expression, merderische oygen, used of gentiles by Polish Jews (47).
These competing versions provide an apt context for Rosenberg's contradictory testimonies: his 1947 assertion that Ivan was dead and his 1987 assertion in the trial that Ivan was alive. Yet the picture is more complicated. On 27 January 1988, as the defense was summing up, Rosenberg was called again to the witness stand. In his earlier testimony, he had revealed that in 1945he had given a written account of Treblinka in Yiddish to a representative of the Polish Government (Teicholz 154 ). Demjanjuk's defense team located this statement in the archives of Warsaw's Jewish Historical Society, and it was confirmed by Rosenberg as his. He wrote, "after this we broke into the engine room toward Ivan, he was asleep then. Gustav, [who] was the first, hit him on the head with a spade. Thus he was left lying there forever" (319). Defense lawyer Paul Chumak asked whether this account was correct. "What I said there I didn't see. I heard," Rosenberg said. "There is a very big difference" (320). The ensuing exchange, as recorded by Teicholz, is worth setting out: (321, trans. Teicholz). In Sheftel's account of Rosenberg's reexamination, the witness is "feigning innocence," looks "like someone who has been caught out in a lie," is "obviously lying," and has "ridiculous explanations" that are "pathetic and false" (180, 181).
In Operation Shylock, something extraordinary happens in the representation of this part of the Demjanjuk trial. Philip attends the hearing on 26 and 27 January 1988; his attendance at the morning session of the 27th is apparent from the note to the reader (399), which is also the day of Rosenberg's reexamination. By this time, the Jerusalem court was well aware of his 1945 and 1947 testimonies recording Ivan's death, which had been reported in the New York Times on 26 February and 31 March 1987. But Roth presents the information as a total surprise:
The death of Ivan? At the sound of those four words coming through the earphones in English translation, young Demjanjuk, seated directly in front of me, began to nod his head vigorously, but otherwise there wasn't a movement to be discerned in the courtroom, not a sound was to be heard until Chumak, with his confident matter-of-factness, set out in his Canadian-accented English to review with Rosenberg the relevant pages of this memoir, in which, apparently just months after the end of the European war, Rosenberg had written of the death of the very man into whose "murderous eyes" he had gazed with such horror and revulsion back on the seventh day of the trial. (291) For readers unfamiliar with the details of a trial conducted five years before the novel's publication, the news that Rosenberg previously declared Ivan to be dead is surprising. Why does Roth stage the revelation in this way, giving it maximum impact by failing to disclose that Rosenberg's 1947 statement was already before the court or to mention the statements by other survivors attesting to Ivan's death?
Arguably, it is to make this paradox central: that Ivan the Terrible can be both dead and alive. This incompatibility trumps even the proposal that Demjanjuk can both be and not be Ivan, for although it is logically possible, it is humanly hard to understand: "your appearance proves only that to be both a loving grandfather and a mass murderer is not all that difficult" (63). Roth stresses the point. Again and again, defense counsel and judges ask Rosenberg whether what he wrote is correct-and Rosenberg agrees that it is correct but that it is not the truth (294). This is the point at which the aesthetic philosophy of Operation Shylock-and Roth's suggested Holocaust historiographybegins to become clear. To escape the logical predicament of Ivan as both alive and dead requires a new kind of logic, or even a suspension of logic.
The Demjanjuk trial debated this epistemological point. The defense, particularly O'Connor, proceeded as though the survivors' body of evidence could be discredited if a single detail could be proved wrong, thus freeing the accused. This approach resulted in what the New York Times described as "one of the saddest moments in the trial" (Friedman 8) when Gustav Boraks, an 86-year-old survivor, was asked the name of his youngest son, Yosef, who had been killed by the Nazis. Poignantly, Boraks hesitated, but the name came back to him: "'I didn't forget!' he defiantly told the judge" (Friedman 8) . In this epistemology-also espoused by Patrick Buchanan, special adviser to Richard Nixon and communications director for Ronald Reagan, who defended Demjanjuk on the basis that "crucial 'eyewitnesses' against him have contradicted themselves and each other under oath" (35)-Rosenberg's dead-and-alive testimony is simply inconsistency on a grand scale. It is this kind of truth-seeking that Tamas Dobozy describes as "juridical legitimacy" or "juridical credibility" and against which may be pitted "the illogic evident in the elisions of story-telling" (37, 39). In Operation Shylock, Roth gives a version of the latter to a character other than a Holocaust survivor. George Ziad mentions that his father used to weep nostalgically about the hills outside Ramallah, saying that every spring he could smell the almond blossoms. But George, O'Connor-like, knowing that the trees bloomed in February, would always "correct his [father's] hyperbole" (152).
To exploit these inconsistencies in the survivors' evidence, Demjanjuk's defense team called on an expert on eyewitness testimony, the psychologist Elizabeth F. Loftus. In Eyewitness Testimony, Loftus described the factors that can affect and impair the accurate acquisition, retention, and retrieval of events in the memory: exposure time, frequency, detail salience, type of fact, violence of event, stress, expectations, perceptual activity, post-event information, guesswork, identification taking place in a new environment, the wording of questions, and the type of interrogation.
9 Gary L. Wells and Donna M. Murray comment specifically on the relation between eyewitness confidence and the ability to be convincing. Confidence is marked by a "self-persuasion" effect-"I chose this person under conditions where I wasn't forced to choose [such as a line-up or photospread] [. . .] therefore, I must be fairly confident that he is the culprit" (Wells and Murray 167)-and, although its relation with accuracy is weak, it remains "an intuitively appealing heuristic for ascribing accuracy to the eye-witness [sic]" (168). In other words, the circumstances of identification can increase confidence, which makes a witness more convincing. The implications for the identification of Demjanjuk as Ivan by Rosenberg and others are obvious.
These implications were not lost on Demjanjuk's defense team, and Loftus was invited to provide expert testimony on Demjanjuk's behalf. In a Rothian twist, however, the Jewish Loftus declined to appear after her uncle, the victim of anti-Semitic treatment in Russia early in the twentieth century, pleaded with her not to participate. She remarked:
[M]y discomfort is especially great. In the eyes of many it would be seen as an attack on the handful of people who miraculously survived Treblinka and now wish to be believed. They would never understand that a questioning of one part of memory does not necessarily mean a denial of all memory. Thus such a testimony would be seen as an unmitigated assault on the only memories we have of Treblinka. (Loftus, "Trials") Wagenaar took her place as a like-minded expert on eyewitnessing. But Wagenaar did not concentrate on the problems of elderly survivors' testimony but rather on the pitfalls of identification from photo spreads (Teicholz 305; Wagenaar) . Nonetheless, the Loftus-Wagenaar approach sums up the "juridical legitimacy" school of thought.
For Dobozy, this epistemology suggests "a view in which a modality of language is equivalent to truth[, and it] raises the specter of Nazism" (47). This, surely, does a disservice to ordinary justice, which must, of necessity, find a single version of events to be true 10 -and to those who, to refute absolutely the deniers and revisers of the Holocaust, try to confine themselves to "the specificity of the violence" (Friedman 8) . There is such a thing as judicial truth-the court of first instance decided that Demjanjuk was Ivan; in 1993 the Israeli Supreme Court decided that he was not; in the interval, he could be described as such with impunity from the libel laws-but, crucially, the Jerusalem Special Tribunal was sensitive to what the New York Times later described as "the interaction of truth and memory" (Herzstein 6) . Finding Rosenberg a "reliable witness who had a long-ranging memory for everything that went on in Treblinka," the judges stated explicitly that "it is not, after all, technical details that will seal the fate of the accused but rather the testimony of survivors, which is etched in their memories" (qtd. in Teicholz 344, 347) . Even Sheftel concurred, noting that O'Connor had "stooped so low" as to ask the color of the flames given off by burning bodies: "every lawyer knows very well that one should not base a cross-examination on contradictions or inaccuracies of the testimony if many years (in this case forty-five) have passed since the events in question took place" (43, 45). The court was, moreover, sympathetic to a different notion of time existing in what Judge Levin called "that different planet Treblinka": "when survivors say they saw Ivan throughout the period, it means he was there and involved in the work of extermination" (qtd. in Teicholz 349). Addressing acts that, in Shaked's words, "simply cannot be grasped" (121), the judges therefore found strict chronology and logical consistency ultimately less persuasive than "misremembered" details and subjective impressions of time. Significantly, this is reflected in Section 15(a) of the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 1950 itself, section 15(a) of which states that "in an action for an offence under this Law, the court may deviate from the rules of evidence if it is satisfied that this will promote the ascertainment of the truth and the just handling of the case" (State of Israel, n. pag.).
In the Special Tribunal, at least, what triumphed was not "juridical credibility" but a different kind of truth system. Holocaust scholars have long recognized this latter epistemology, who nevertheless continue to refine and redefine its nuances, particularly in the ongoing debate about whether it is possible, or proper, to represent the Holocaust at all. Thirty years ago, Lawrence Langer wrote:
To establish an order of reality in which the unimaginable becomes imaginatively acceptable exceeds the capacities of an art devoted entirely to verisimilitude;
Fall 2007 some quality of the fantastic, whether stylistic or descriptive, becomes an essential ingredient of l'univers concentrationnaire. Indeed, those who recorded details painstakingly in an attempt to omit none of the horror may have been unwittingly guilty of ignoring precisely the chief source of that horror-existence in a middle realm between life and death with its ambiguous and inconsistent appeals to survival and extinction, which continuously undermined the logic of experience without offering any satisfactory alternative. (43) In 2001, Michael Bernard-Donals and Richard Glejzer, invoking Kant and mystical Judaism, named this "quality of the fantastic" the "sublime" (xi). Contrasting witnessing (the moment of seeing the trauma) with testimony (the compulsion and attempt to speak about it), they located the "feeling of the sublimity" at "the limit of testimony" (xii, xi). Gaps, the inability to speak, and hesitations in recountings are all points at which "the act of witnessing makes itself fully apparent to the witness himself, but which can only be glimpsed, through those gaps, by the interviewer or reader" (58). Witness, moreover, "can only be accessible to the extent that it is not fully perceived or experienced as it occurs, and it can only be grasped in the very inaccessibility of its occurrence" (58). This metaphysical understanding matches what others have argued as the psychological verity of uttering memories of the Holocaust. Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub propose that testimony is not so much a "statement of, but access to," truth (16): the "emergence of narrative" is a process wherein the "knowing of [an] event is given birth to" (57). The sublime is ineffable but, as Bernard-Donals and Glejzer argue, it is also the only way in which the ineffable can be glimpsed: "Sublimity is the means by which the presentation (Darstellung) of the trace of the event of the Shoah itself is accomplished by a failure inherent in representation (Vorstellung)" (13; emphasis in original). It is in gap, inconsistency, and hesitation that the possibility of fleetingly accessing the original trauma resides. The point is not quite the same as the old cliché that truth is stranger than fiction, but rather, that strangeness is the only way in to some truths.
Those who read or listen to Holocaust testimonies will recognize this description of pauses, fragmentations, and aporia. But in Operation Shylock, Roth offers particularly flagrant examples of the epistemology: the propositions that Demjanjuk both is and is not Ivan, and that Ivan is both dead and alive. The reason why the novel distorts the events of the Demjanjuk trial in such a theatrical way is to underscore Rosenberg's self-contradictory testimony. The result is to emphasize as much the unhearability/incomprehensibility of the Holocaust as its unspeakability because the necessary corollary of inconsistency (or, in Bernard-Donals and Glejzer's term, sublimity) is confusion and disbelief from listeners.
The disbelieving listener is the stuff of the survivor's nightmares. Most famously, Primo Levi dreamed in Auschwitz of telling his story to an "indifferent" audience; his sister even rises and goes away. Levi feels "a desolating grief [. . .] (223; emphasis in original) . Denial, or disbelief, is also the response of those who find the truth of the Holocaust "too much." But Roth's tactic is only to increase the preposterousness, as though, paradoxically, it is only in the face of particularly blatant breaches of consistency and verisimilitude that belief has a chance.
Mutual incompatibility is, then, the aesthetic of Operation Shylock, a novel that makes irreconcilable claims to fact and fiction. This aesthetic is also an ethos and a historiography: the former a way of understanding the Holocaust, the latter a way of representing it without reducing it either to fiction-"Please," Philip cries at one point, "no metaphors where there is recorded history!" (142)-or to silence. As Philip remarks, "The Germans have proved definitively to all the world that to maintain two radically divergent personalities, one very nice and one not so nice, is no longer the prerogative of psychopaths," and Demjanjuk's challenge, "How could I be both that and this?", consequently founders (63). A mutually exclusive pair of opposites is no grounds for disbelief. "There are meaningful arrangements that defy causal explanation and they are happening all the time," says Pipik (79; emphasis in original). That the truth will be less plausible than fiction is reiterated at length.
12 Appelfeld tells Philip, "My real world [of the camps and forest] was far beyond the power of imagination, and my task as an artist was not to develop my imagination but to restrain it, and even then it seemed impossible to me, because everything was so unbelievable that one seemed oneself to be fictional" (56). Philip concludes that "when life looks least what it's supposed to look like, it may then be most like whatever it is" (252-53).
"The reality of the Holocaust surpassed any imagination," Appelfeld tells Philip-just as the nonfictional Appelfeld told Philip Roth in a 1988 interview ("A Talk with Aharon Appelfeld" 29)-and then goes on to say, "If I remained true to the facts, no one would believe me" (Operation Shylock 86). The reverse logic is also true, and the reason why Demjanjuk-in a way reminiscent of Appelfeld's immortal Bartfuss, who lives a life of agonizing triviality-must entertain a dream of ordinariness, for (in Philip's projection) "all this innocuousness disproves a thousand times over these crazy accusations" (63). The Holocaust was, and remains, a logical predicament-humans committing inhuman acts-and, for Roth, what is important is to perpetuate the impossibilities, not resolve them, so as to maintain the "dispute, incarnate" (334). By the time of his abduction, Philip is in a position to say to his double, "I am Philip Roth and you are Philip Roth," and mean it (320). "Better," he thinks, "for real things to be uncontrollable, better for one's life to be indecipherable and intellectually impenetrable than to attempt to make causal sense of what is unknown" (290).
